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Abstract—In this paper the Output Statistics of Random Bin-
ning (OSRB) framework is used to prove a new inner bound for
the problem of secure channel simulation. Our results subsume
some recent results on the secure function computation. We also
provide an achievability result for the problem of simultaneously
simulating a channel and creating a shared secret key. A special
case of this result generalizes the lower bound of Gohari and
Anantharam on the source model to include constraints on the
rates of the public discussion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Output statistics of random binning [6] is a new framework
for proving achievability results. In this paper we use this
framework to extend the secure function computation of [3]
for the case of two users, where two users are observing i.i.d.
repetitions of X1 and X2 and would like to construct i.i.d.
repetitions of Y = f(X1, X2) after interactively exchanging
messages on a public channel. I.i.d. repetitions of the func-
tion Y has to remain nearly independent of the messages
exchanged. It was shown in [3] that this is possible if and only
if H(Y ) < I(X1;X2). This work was further generalized in
[4]. We extend the achievability part of the existing results
by assuming that there is an eavesdropper who has access to
i.i.d. repetitions of Z . Further in our model the two party want
to generate i.i.d. repetitions of Y1 and Y2 where Y1 and Y2
are not necessarily functions of X1 and X2; they are jointly
distributed with X1, X2 and Z according to some arbitrary
p(y1, y2|x1, x2)p(x1, x2, z). We demand a reliable generation
of Y n1 and Y n2 meaning that the total variation distance
between the pmf of the generated (Y n1 , Y n2 , Xn1 , Xn2 , Zn) and
the i.i.d. pmf must go to zero asymptotically as n goes
to infinity. Further, the public discussion must reveal no
new information to Eve about an Sn, created by passing
(Y n1 , Y
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 , Z
n) of the code through n copies of the
channel p(s|x1, x2, y1, y2, z). A special case of interest is
when S = (Y1, Y2) meaning that we would like to keep
the generated rv’s hidden from Eve. In our model we further
assume rate limited public discussion and a preshared secret
key at rate R0. Lastly we provide an achievability result for the
problem of simultaneously simulating a channel and creating a
shared secret key. A special case of this result generalizes the
lower bound of Gohari and Anantharam on the source model
[7] to include constraints on the rates of the public discussion.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we review
the output statistics of random binning technique at some
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length. In Section III we discuss our new inner bound for the
secure channel simulation problem. In Section IV we discuss
simultaneous simulation of a channel and generation of a
secret key.
Notation: All random variables are taking values in finite
sets. We use [1 : r] to denote the set {1, 2, 3, . . . , r}, XS to
denote (Xj : j ∈ S) and pUA to denote the uniform distribution
over the set A. Given a natural number i, (i)2 is 1 if i
is odd, and is 0 if i is even. The total variation between
two pmf’s p and q on the same alphabet X , is defined by
‖p(x) − q(x)‖1 :=
1
2
∑
x |p(x) − q(x)|.
II. REVIEW OF OUTPUT STATISTICS OF RANDOM BINNING
To illustrate the main ideas behind the OSRB technique,
we begin by two examples, each of which connects a source
coding problem to a channel coding problem. Our discussion
is at an intuitive level; see [6] for a rigorous treatment.
The first example connects Wyner’s wiretap channel [2]
to the one-way source model key agreement problem [1].
Consider the source model key agreement problem: Alice,
Bob and Eve have access to i.i.d. repetitions of Xn, Y n and
Zn respectively, distributed according to
∏n
i=1 p(xi, yi, zi). It
is known that the key rate I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z) is achievable
(when I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z) > 0). To obtain this rate, Alice
sends the Slepian-Wolf (SW) index of Xn to Bob (at rate
H(X |Y ) + ǫ) over a public channel. Then Alice constructs
the key M by binning Xn into 2n(I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)−ǫ) bins (this
binning is independent of the SW binning). If we denote the
public message by B and the key by M , the following hold:
both B and M are random bin indices of Xn, and the key M
is nearly independent of (B,Zn). Thus there is an instance
of B = b such that conditioned on B = b the following
two properties hold: M is nearly independent of Zn, and Bob
can recover the key M with high probability (conditioned on
B = b). Since B is a function of Xn, we have the factorization
p(xn, yn, zn|b) = p(xn|b)p(yn, zn|xn). In other words condi-
tioning on B = b only changes the marginal distribution of Xn
but leaves the channel from Xn to (Y n, Zn), i.e. p(yn, zn|xn),
undisturbed. Further p(m, zn|b) ≃ p(m)p(zn|b) and Bob can
almost recover M from Y n conditioned on B = b. The
joint distribution of these random variables (conditioned on
a fixed B = b) can be used to construct a code for secure
transmission over a wiretap channel p(y, z|x). We interpret
M as the message to be transmitted. Since M is nearly
independent of B, conditioning on B = b does not change
its marginal distribution (thus it is still uniform over a set of
size 2n(I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)−ǫ)). Further conditioned on B = b, the
message M is nearly independent of Zn and can be recovered
from Y n. Lastly p(yn, zn|xn, b) = p(yn, zn|xn). This shows
that the rate I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) is achievable for the wiretap
problem. It is not difficult to modify this proof to show that
maxp(u,x) I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z) is also achievable for the wiretap
channel problem (and indeed this is the capacity region).
Next, consider the problem of sending a message M of
rate R over the channel p(y|x). The input distribution p(xn)
is uniform over the 2nR codewords, thus it is not i.i.d. .
However Shannon’s idea of generating a random codebook
makes the input distribution i.i.d. . Shannon noted that granting
a preshared randomness between the encoder and decoder
(denoted by B and independent of the message M ) does not
increase the capacity of the channel (see the top diagram of
Fig. 1). However the encoder and decoder can use this com-
mon randomness to generate an i.i.d. random codebook. Once
the random codebook is generated at both the encoder and the
decoder, a codeword is chosen according to the value of M
and is transmitted over the channel. Thus we have an encoder
Xn(M,B) and a decoder Mˆ(Y n, B). Since the probability
of error is the average of that over all realizations of B, one
can find b such that Xn(M,B = b) and Mˆ(Y n, B = b)
form appropriate encoder and decoder. The input Xn(M,B)
is i.i.d., although Xn(M,B = b) is not so. Now, note that the
joint pmf PM,B,Xn = PMPBPXn|M,B can also be written as
PXnPM,B|Xn . This is as if we generate an i.i.d. Xn and pass it
through a virtual reverse encoder PM,B|Xn to generate M and
B. This is depicted in the bottom diagram of Fig. 1 where we
have changed the direction of arrows to reflect this change of
order. In this interpretation we are starting from an i.i.d. Xn
and Y n according to
∏n
i=1 p(xi, yi). Random variable B is
now a (public) message transmitted from the transmitter to the
receiver. We can view it as the Slepian-Wolf message from Xn
to Y n. Once the decoder has recoveredXn it can recoverM , if
M is a function of Xn. Now we are ready to create the source
coding counterpart. We take some arbitrary p(x) and generate
n i.i.d. copies of Xn and Y n according to p(x)p(y|x). We then
construct B and M as random partitions (binnings) of Xn.
Random variable B is a SW index of size n(H(X |Y ) + ǫ).
It enables the receiver to recover Xn with high probability.
Thus, the receiver can recover M . Next we see that in the
channel coding side, M and B are independent and M is
uniform. Thus we are looking for constraints that make bin
indices B and M of an i.i.d. Xn independent, and M uniform.
It turns out that as long as log |B| + log |M| < nH(X),
rv’s B and M are independent, and M is uniform. This
holds for instance if |M| < 2I(X;Y )−2ǫ, giving us the rate
I(X ;Y )− 2ǫ. To go back to the channel coding problem we
look at the PXn,M,B imposed by M , B and Xn. Next we
take PXn|M,B and use it in the channel coding setup of Fig.
1. To get away with shared randomness B, we observe that
we still have the property that p(yn|xn, B = b) = p(yn|xn)
and p(m|B = b) ≈ p(m) meaning that Xn(M,B = b) and
Mˆ(Y n, B = b) are legitimate choices as the encoder and
decoder; we are done.
pY |XXn(M,B)EncM
B
Dec M̂
Y n
pY |XXnPMB|XnM
B
Dec M̂Y
n
Fig. 1. (Top) Point-to-point channel with preshared randomness B to generate
a random codebook. (Bottom) The corresponding source coding problem:
reversing the order of generating rv’s in the box.
Observe the secrecy flavor of the source coding side of the
problem: we start from i.i.d. repetitions of Xn, Y n; we can
interpret B as a public message, and M as a secret key which
is independent of B. This is an instance of the source model
SK generation problem.
The OSRB framework is a systematic way of converting
channel coding problems into source coding problems (the
above examples show how that can happen). The advantage of
the conversion is that in the source coding side of the problem
we only have one copy of the random variables, e.g. in the
point to point example we start from a single i.i.d. copy of
Xn, Y n; all the other rv’s (i.e. M and B) are random bins
of these i.i.d. rvs. However if we were to directly attack the
channel coding problem, we had to create a codebook of size
2nR containing lots of xn sequences. This conversion is useful
in problems involving multi-round interactive communication
with several auxiliary random variables (e.g. the problem
studied in this paper) where it is desirable to have just a
single i.i.d. repetition of all the original and auxiliary random
variable (rather than having many i.i.d. copies of these random
variables related to each other through superposition or Marton
coding type structures). Once we take a single i.i.d. copy, all
the messages and preshared randomness (such as B) can be
constructed as random bins of these i.i.d. rv’s. Traditional
coding techniques start with the messages and then create
the many codewords. Here we are reversing the order by
starting from a single i.i.d. copy of the original and auxiliary
rv’s, and constructing the messages as bin indices afterwards.
And this can simplify representing the codebook construction
and analyzing its probability of success. For instance while
the traditional framework considers superposition coding and
Marton coding as distinct coding constructions, in the new
framework the two constructions are nothing but two different
ways of specifying the set of i.i.d. rv’s we are binning. Thus
the new framework unifies the two coding strategies, for it
only uses random binning.
In the traditional framework we need to count the size of
typical sets; this is generally done via covering and packing
lemmas. However in the OSRB framework we need to find
two sets of conditions: one set of conditions for Slepian-Wolf
decoders to succeed and another set implying independence of
certain random bin indices. Thm. 1 of [6] provides sufficient
conditions for the latter. This change from counting typical
sequences to working with output statistics of random binnings
provides a framework to prove results under a strong notion of
security conveniently. This is partly due to the fact that OSRB
brings the randomness of random codebook generation from
the background into the foreground as an explicit rv (e.g. B
in the above example), or a set of rv’ s.
III. SECURE CHANNEL SIMULATION BY TWO TERMINALS
We begin with the formulation of the problem without any
secrecy constraints as in [5]:
A. Channel Simulation with no secrecy constraints
Assume that Alice and Bob observe i.i.d. repetitions of two
random variables X1 and X2 respectively, and would like
to generate i.i.d. repetitions of rv’s Y1 and Y2 respectively.
Random variables X1, X2, Y1, Y2 are jointly distributed ac-
cording to a given p(x[1:2])p(y[1:2]|x[1:2]). Alice and Bob are
also provided with shared randomness at a rate R0. The two
parties can interactively talk to each other over r rounds as they
wish; the only constraints are that the total communication rate
from Alice to Bob is bounded from above by R12 and the total
communication rate from Bob to Alice is bounded from above
by R21. The question is for which values of (R0, R12, R21)
the pmf p(x[1:2], y[1:2]) can be asymptotically achieved; i.e. for
every ǫ > 0 there is a sequence of (n, ǫ) codes that results in
p˜(xn[1:2], y
n
[1:2]) satisfying the following for large n
∥∥∥∥∥p˜(x
n
[1:2], y
n
[1:2])−
n∏
i=1
p(x[1:2],i, y[1:2],i)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ. (1)
Remark 1 When Y1 and Y2 are deterministic functions of X1
and X2, the problem would be that of finding two functions
via interactive communication.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of [5]) The simulation rate region
is the set S(r) of all non-negative rate tuples (R0, R12, R21),
for which there exists p(f[1:r]|x[1:2], y[1:2]) ∈ T (r) such that
R12 ≥ I(X1;F[1:r]|X2), (2)
R21 ≥ I(X2;F[1:r]|X1), (3)
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X1;F[1:r]|X2) + I(F1;Y[1:2]|X[1:2]),
(4)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X1;F[1:r]|X2) + I(X2;F[1:r]|X1)
+ I(F[1:r];Y[1:2]|X[1:2]), (5)
where T (r) is the set of p(f[1:r]|x[1:2], y[1:2]) satisfying
Fi−F[1:i−1]X1 −X2, if i is odd,
Fi−F[1:i−1]X2 −X1, if i is even,
Y1−F[1:r]X1 −X2Y2, Y2 − F[1:r]X2 −X1Y1. (6)
Remark 2 The non-symmetric equation (4) is due to the fact
that the region is for a finite r rounds of communication, with
the first party starting the communication. The region would
have been symmetric if the region was for infinite rounds of
communication (i.e. r →∞).
To prove this theorem in [5], we take some arbitrary
p(f[1:r]|x[1:2], y[1:2]) ∈ T (r). We start from the source cod-
ing side of the problem where only a single i.i.d. copy of
(Fn1 , · · · , F
n
r , X
n
[1:2], Y
n
[1:2]) is created. The messages to be
communicated in each stage Ki, the preshared randomness
variables Bi, and the actual real shared randomness ω (of
rate R0) are created as bin indices of these i.i.d. variables
in the following way: B1, K1 and ω are bin indices of three
independent binning of Fn1 . Rv’s Bi and Ki are bin indices
of two independent binnings of (Fn1 , · · · , Fni ). The alphabet
sizes of ω, Ki and Bi are 2nR0 , 2nRi and 2nR˜i respectively.
Just as in the point to point case, there are going to be some
constraints for the Slepian-Wolf decodings to work (similar to
the point to point condition of Y n and B being sufficient to
recover Xn), and some constraints for independence of the
bin indices (similar to the point to point condition of B and
M being nearly independent) to allow us reverse the encoders
and go from the source coding side to our original problem.
We report the list of these conditions from [5].
1) Reliability of SW decoders:
R1 + R0 + R˜1 ≥ H(F1|X2),
Ri + R˜i ≥ H(Fi|X(i+1)2F[1:i−1]) ∀i ∈ [2 : r].
where (i)2 was defined at the end of introduction.
2) Independence constraints:
R0 + R˜1 < H(F1|X1),
R˜i < H(Fi|X(i)2F[1:i−1]) ∀i ∈ [2 : r],
i∑
t=1
R˜t < H(F[1:i]|X[1:2]Y[1:2]) ∀i ∈ [1 : r].
A Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the above constraints gives
the region given in Thm. 1. To intuitively understand the
reliability of SW decoders constraints, note that common
randomness ω, B1 and K1 are random bin indices of Fn1
created by Alice. Bob needs a rate of H(F1|X2) from Alice to
decode Fn1 (and use it to create Fn2 for the next round). This
corresponds to the first SW constraint. Other SW constraints
are similar with Bi and Ki serving as the random bin indices
of Fni .
The first two independence constraints ensure that B[1:r],
ω and Xn[1:2] are mutually independent: the first condition
implies that B1, ω and Xn[1:2] are mutually independent, and
the second constraint implies that Bi is nearly independent of
(B[1:i−1], ω,X
n
[1:2]). To see this observe that the first indepen-
dence constraint correspond to B1 and ω being nearly mutually
independent of each other and of Xn1 (thus also independent
of Xn[1:2] because of the Markov chain F1 − X1 − X2 and
the fact that B1 and ω are bins of Fn1 ). The second inde-
pendence constraint implies that Bi is nearly independent of
Xn(i)2F
n
[1:i−1]. Because Bi is a bin index of Fni and because
of the Markov chain Fi − X(i)2F[1:i−1] − X(i+1)2 , Bi will
be nearly independent of Xn[1:2]Fn[1:i−1]. Next since B[1:i−1]
and ω are functions of Fn[1:i−1], Bi will be nearly indepen-
dent of (B[1:i−1], ω,Xn[1:2]). Finally, the last independence
constraint implies that B[1:r] is nearly mutually independent
of Xn[1:2]Y
n
[1:2]. Thus conditioning on a certain instance of
B[1:r] = b[1:r] does not disturb the joint pmf of Xn[1:2]Y n[1:2].
B. Channel Simulation with an eavesdropper
We consider an eavesdropper (Eve) who is observing
i.i.d. copies of Z , jointly distributed with X1, X2. We
assume that Alice and Bob want to generate i.i.d. repeti-
tions of Y1 and Y2 (within a vanishing total variation dis-
tance) jointly distributed with X1, X2, Z according to a given
p(x1, x2, z)p(y1, y2|x1, x2). Meanwhile they want to make
sure that the public discussion reveals no new information to
Eve about an Sn, created by passing (Y n1 , Y n2 , Xn1 , Xn2 , Zn) of
the code through n copies of the channel p(s|x1, x2, y1, y2, z).
We assume that Alice and Bob are provided with a preshared
secret key of rate R0.
Public communications are rate constrained by R12 and R21
as before. The secrecy constraint is
lim
n→∞
|I(Sn;Zn,K1, · · · ,Kr)− nI(S;Z)| = 0
over a sequence of codes where K1, K2, ..., Kr are
the messages exchanged during the r rounds of in-
teractive communication. Observe that we are using a
strong notion of secrecy here. A strong notion of secrecy
demands a vanishing |I(Sn;Zn,K1, · · · ,Kr)− nI(S;Z)|,
whereas the weak notion of secrecy demands a vanishing
1
n
|I(Sn;Zn,K1, · · · ,Kr)− nI(S;Z)|.
The following theorem provides our result on the secure
channel simulation. A slightly stronger version of this theorem
can be found in [8].
Theorem 2 The set of achievable rate tuples includes
all non-negative (R0, R12, R21), for which there exists
p(f[1:r], x[1:2], y[1:2], z, s) such that equations (2)-(5), the
Markov constraints
X[1:2], Z, Y[1:2], S ∼ p(x[1:2], z)p(y[1:2]|x[1:2])p(s|x[1:2]y[1:2]z),
Fi−F[1:i−1]X1 −X2Z, if i is odd,
Fi−F[1:i−1]X2 −X1Z, if i is even,
Y1 − F[1:r]X1 −X2Y2Z,
Y2 − F[1:r]X2 −X1Y1Z,
S −X[1:2]Y[1:2]Z − F[1:r] (7)
and the following additional constraint (for all i ∈ [1 : r]) are
satisfied.
I(F[1:i];SZ) + I(X1;X2|F[1:i]) < R0 + I(X1;X2). (8)
Discussion. The above theorem implies the achievability
part of the result of [3] in the case of two terminals. Consider
the special case of Y1 = Y2 = S = Y = g(X1, X2), Z = ∅,
r = 2, F1 = X1, F2 = X2, R0 = 0, R12 =∞ and R21 =∞.
It shows that a function Y = g(X1, X2) can be generated
securely at both terminals if H(Y ) < I(X1;X2). Further if we
have a preshared secret key at rate R0, this condition reduces
to H(Y ) < I(X1;X2) +R0.
Next, consider the special case of Y2 = ∅ and Y1 =
g(X1, X2), i.e. only one terminal is interested in computing
a function. As before assume Z = ∅, r = 2, R12 = ∞ and
R21 =∞. In this case we can choose F1 = ∅ and F2 = X2.
This gives us the constraint I(X2;Y1) < I(X2;X1) + R0.
When R0 = 0 we get a result already known from [3].
Another special case is when H(Y2|Y1) = 0 and Y1 =
g(X1, X2), i.e. the function computed by the second terminal
is a function of the one computed by the first terminal. Further
assume S = Y1, meaning that we would like to make sure that
the eavesdropper learns nothing about Y1. As before we are
not charging the public discussion, i.e. R12 = ∞ and R21 =
∞. Assume further that R0 = 0. It is shown in Corollary
4 of [4] that secure computation is possible if and only if
H(X1, X2|Y1) > H(X2|X1) + H(Y2|X2) + H(X1|Y1, X2).
Observe that this condition is equivalent with I(X1;X2) >
I(X2Y2;Y1). To achieve it we can set F1 = ∅, F2 = X2,
F3 = Y2.
Proof: We use the OSRB technique as above and create
a single i.i.d. copy of (Fn1 , · · · , Fnr , Xn[1:2], Y n[1:2], Zn, Sn), as
well as bin indices ω, Ki and Bi just as above. To impose
the secrecy constraint, it suffices to ensure that (Sn, Zn)
is nearly independent of (B1:r,K1:r), the public messages
and the preshared randomness variables. This implies that
for almost all choices of B1:r = b1:r, the mutual infor-
mation I(Sn;Zn,K1:r|B1:r = b1:r) is asymptotically zero.
To accomplish this we impose a stronger constraint that
implies B1:r, K1:r and (Sn, Zn) are asymptotically mutually
independent. Using Thm. 1 of [6] (after removing redundant
equations arising because the random variables we are binning
are nested) we can write the condition as (see the full version
for details [8]):
i∑
t=1
(Rt + R˜t) < H(F[1:i]|S,Z) ∀i ∈ [1 : r].
The Reliability and Independence constraints would not
change. Applying a Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we get the
region given in the statement of the theorem. See [8] for tricks
to do the elimination efficiently.
IV. SECURE CHANNEL SIMULATION AND SECRET KEY
GENERATION
When R12 = R21 = ∞, Z = ∅ and R0 = 0, Tyagi et
al. have shown that secure computing of a common function
Y1 = Y2 = Y = g(X1, X2) is possible if and only if
H(Y ) < I(X1;X2). The mutual information I(X1;X2) is
the secret key capacity of the corresponding source model
problem. Thus H(Y ) cannot exceed I(X1;X2) since Y itself
can serve as a secret key. Thus the non-trivial part is the
achievability part. The authors in [3] also show that the ter-
minals can compute Y while simultaneously creating a secret
key of rate I(X1;X2) − H(Y ) that is mutually independent
of Y and the public discussion. Therefore the function can be
augmented by a residual secret key to yield an optimal SK
generation scheme. But what if Z is not a constant rv? The
SK capacity is not known in this case. The best known lower
bound is given in [7]. Note that the public discussion was not
charged in [7]. Thus it would be desirable to prove a theorem
that unifies these results.
In our work Alice and Bob generate Y1 and Y2 which are
not necessarily equal. Let us first assume that Y1 = Y2 =
Y . However unlike [3], rv Y is not necessarily a function of
(X1, X2); the conditional pmf p(y|x1, x2) can be arbitrary.
Setting S = Y guarantees that Eve does not learn about Y
more than I(Y ;Z). Thus, Alice and Bob can extract a secret
key of rate H(Y |Z) (by taking a hash or random bin of their
Y n sequences). In order to augment this key with an additional
secret key, Alice and Bob use a code that enables them to
simultaneously create a secret key T that is independent of
Y n, Zn and the public discussion. In this case it is desirable
to know if they can create a key of rate “secret key capacity
minus H(Y |Z)”.
But how about the general case of Y1 6= Y2? Here we
cannot use either Y1, Y2 or an S as part of a secret key
since neither is available at both parties. The natural extension
is to imagine a fourth party, Charles, who is getting Sn.
Alice and Bob want to generate Y n1 and Y n2 while protecting
Charles against Eve (by making sure that Eve does not learn
anything new about Sn). Here Alice and Bob also create a
secret key T that is secure against both Eve and Charles, i.e.
I(T ;Sn, Zn,K1, · · · ,Kr) → 0 as n converges to infinity.
In other words, we would like the key to be independent of
Sn, Zn and the public discussion under a strong notion of
secrecy. We use RSK to denote the rate of the generated secret
key. In the special case of S = Y1 = Y2 = Y , this problem
reduces to the one discussed in the above paragraph.
Let us begin with the lower bound of [7]: for any set of
random variables F1, F2, ..., Fr such that Fi−F[1:i−1]X(i)2 −
ZX(i+1)2 form a Markov chain, and for any a ∈ [1 : r], the
secret key rate
r∑
i=a
(
I(Fi;X(i+1)2 |F[1:i−1])− I(Fi;Z|F[1:i−1])
)
=
I(X1;X2|F[1:a−1])− I(X1;X2|F[1:r])− I(F[1:r];Z|F[1:a−1])
is achievable. The choice of a = 1 is the best choice in the
lower bound when for any a′ ∈ [1 : r]
a′∑
i=1
(
I(Fi;X(i+1)2 |F[1:i−1])− I(Fi;Z|F[1:i−1])
)
> 0, (9)
otherwise we can replace a = 1 with a′ to get a strictly
larger inner bound. To convey the ideas in the simplest way
we restrict ourselves to the lower bound when the choice of
a = 1 is optimal, and state the following theorem. A stronger
version of this theorem can be found in [8].
Theorem 3 Take an arbitrary rate tuple (R0, R12, R21) for
which there exists p(f[1:r], x[1:2], y[1:2], z, s) such that equa-
tions (2)-(5), the Markov constraints given in (7) and Eq. (8)
hold. Then a secret key of rate RSK can be simultaneously
created during the secure channel simulation protocol if
RSK < R0 +
r∑
i=1
(
I(Fi;X(i+1)2 |F[1:i−1])− I(Fi;ZS|F[1:i−1])
)
= R0 + I(X1;X2)− I(X1;X2|F[1:r])− I(F[1:r];ZS).
(10)
Remark 3 When S = Y1 = Y2 = ∅, R0 = 0 and
R12 = R21 = ∞ we get back the lower bound of [7] for
the case of a = 1. Eq. (8) reduces to (9) in this case which
is automatically satisfied when a = 1 is an optimal choice. In
[8] we provide a complete generalization.
Remark 4 When S = Y1 = Y2 = Y = g(X1, X2) and R12 =
R21 =∞ we can set F1 = X1 and F2 = X2 to get achievable
secret key rate [I(X1;X2) − I(X1X2;Z)] −H(Y |Z). When
Z = ∅ we get I(X1;X2)−H(Y ), indicating that this choice
is optimal. However this choice for Fi, i ∈ [1 : r] is not
necessarily optimal when Z is not constant.
Proof: We follow the same scheme as in the previous
case, at the end of which we create T as the bin index of a
random binning of Fn[1:r] (with the number of bins equal to
2nRSK ). Since Fn[1:r] is available to both parties at the end of
the protocol, both parties can agree on T with high probability
(see [8] for rigorous statements). Thus we need conditions that
imply T is independent of (B[1:r],K[1:r], Sn, Zn). It suffices
to make sure that T , Sn, Zn and B[1:r] and K[1:r] are mutually
independent. Using Thm. 1 of [6] (after removing redundant
equations) we can write the conditions as (see the full version
for details [8]):
RSK +
r∑
t=1
(Rt + R˜t) < H(F[1:r]|S,Z),
a′∑
t=1
(Rt + R˜t) < H(F[1:i]|S,Z), ∀a
′ ∈ [1 : r].
Applying a Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we get the Eq. (10) as
well as the following additional constraints for any a′ ∈ [1 : r]
R0 +
a′∑
i=1
(
I(Fi;X(i)2 |F[1:i−1])− I(Fi;ZS|F[1:i−1])
)
> 0.
The above constraint is identical to the one given in Eq. (8).
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